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INCONSISTENCIES AND UNNECESSARY INJUSTICES
UNDER THE MISSOURI CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
STATUTE: MO. REV. STAT. Sec. 301.2 10 (I949)
The automobile is a highly mobile chattel with a ready resale
market for its disposal and thus is often the prey of thieves. In an
attempt to prevent traffic in stolen automobiles, most states have
passed statutes requiring a transfer of the certificate of title to a
used automobile as part of the transaction involving its purchase and
sale.1 This is a departure from the common law which did not require
the transfer of a certificate manifesting ownership of a chattel to
perfect a purchaser's title.2
To compel compliance by the parties to a purchase and sale of a
used automobile with the statutory requirement of transfer of certi-
ficate of title, states have generally imposed one of two sanctions:
(1) a monetary penalty;3 and (2) a designation of the transaction
as void. 4 The Missouri legislature has incorporated the latter sanction
into its title transfer statute and has further designated an improper
sale as fraudulent and unlawful.5
In Missouri, the certificate of title in a legitimate sale is passed in
the following manner. When the used automobile is sold,0 the seller's
1. See Comment, 10 Ark L. Rev. 143 (1955-56).
2. See Brown, Personal Property §§ 66-72 (2d ed. 1955).
3. E.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 23.11 (1941). "It shall be unlawful foz
any person . .. to sell or dispose of... a used vehicle without delivering to the
purchaser an Oklahoma certificate of title in such purchaser's name or one prop-
erly and completely assigned to him at the time of sale.
"Anyone violating any of the provisions heretofore enumerated . . . shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction... shall be fined .... *1
4. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-6-8 (1953). "[N]o person shall sell or
otherwise transfer a motor vehicle to a purchaser or transferee thereof without
delivering to such purchaser or transferee the certificate of title to such vehicle
... and, no puchaser or transferee shall acquire any right, title or interest in...
a motor vehicle. . . unless ... he shall obtain from the transferor the certificate
of title thereto .... "
5. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 301.210 (1949). "4. It shall be unlawful for any person to
buy or sell in this state any motor vehicle or trailer registered under the laws of
this state, unless at the time of the delivery thereof, there shall pass between the
parties such certificate of ownership with an assignment thereof, as herein pro-
vided, and the sale of any motor vehicle or trailer registered under the laws of
this state, without the assignment of such certificate of ownership, shall be
fraudulent and void."
6. This note will only be concerned with the sale of used automobiles. The
sale of a new car may be made without a certificate of title. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 301.200 (1949).
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certificate of title is given to the purchaser, who sends it to the state
agency in charge of motor vehicle registration. The change of owner-
ship is then recorded and a new certificate of title issued to the
purchaser. It is important to note that for a seller to pass good title
there must be, in addition to delivery of the certificate, 7 a proper
assignment8 and acknowledgment" of the certificate. Nothing short
of exact compliance with the statute will suffice.
A few simple illustrations of the effect of the statute will be useful
to understand the problems that are the subject of this note. Suppose
defendant-purchaser acquires possession of an automobile from an
intermediate seller without receiving the certificate of title, the inter-
mediate seller having acquired his possession from the plaintiff who
presently holds the certificate. The following situations might exist:
(1) the intermediate seller fraudulently acquired possession of the
vehicle from the plaintiff;10 (2) plaintiff placed the intermediate
seller in a position which indicated that he had ostensible ownership
of the vehicle;" (3) there was neither fraud nor ostensible owner-
ship, but the defendant would have been a bona fide purchaser at
common law.1 -2
In situations one and two, it was well established at common law
that the intermediate seller could convey good title.13 In the fraud
situation this result was reached by viewing the intermediate seller's
title as voidable rather than void, which enabled him to perfect title
in a bona fide purchaser. The rationale of the ostensible ownership
situation is that the original owner, by placing the intermediate seller
in a position which indicated to the world that the latter could convey
title, was estopped from claiming that the seller could not pass good
title. In effect the seller was in the same position as one holding void-
able title.
The Missouri statute abolishes the distinction between void and
voidable titles and under its provisions the common law result would
not be reached in situations one and two-the plaintiff-holder of the
certificate would prevail. The questions presented in the third situa-
7. Pruitt Truck & Implement Co. v. Ferguson, 216 Ark. 848, 227 S.W.2d 944
(1950) (applying Missouri law); Counts v. Metzger, 228 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. App.
1950); Quinn v. Gehlert, 291 S.W. 138 (Mo. App. 1927); Muzenich v. McCain,
220 Mo. App. 502, 274 S.W. 888 (1925).
8. Payne v. Strothkamp, 153 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App. 1941).
9. Wills v. Shepherd, 231 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. App. 1950).
10. Ibid; Muzenich v. McCain, 220 Mo. App. 502, 274 S.W. 888 (1925).
11. Payne v. Strothkamp, 153 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. App. 1941); Quinn v. Gehlert,
291 S.W. 138 (Mo. App. 1927).
12. Robinson v. Poole, 232 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. App. 1950); Counts v. Metzgar,
228 S.W.2d 395 (Mo. App. 1950).
13. See Brown, Personal Property §§ 70-71 (2d ed. 1955).
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tion is whether the statute constitutes notice that a certificate is
necessary to perfect title. Following the plain meaning of the statute,
the courts have taken the position that, notwithstanding the equities
of a given situation, one can not be a bona fide purchaser unless he
receives the certificate of title.'14
As illustrated above, regardless how unjust one's position might
be, he will prevail if he has the certificate of title. However, when
terms like "void," "fraudulent," and "unlawful" appear in a statute,
one may expect unusual consequences. In fact, there are several in-
stances where Missouri courts have reached inconsistent results in
applying the statute. There are also certain areas where the results,
though consistent with the statutory wording, appear unnecessarily
harsh in view of the ultimate purpose of the statute, i.e., to prevent
traffic in stolen automobiles. This note, while not intended to be
exhaustive, will discuss some of the more important of these incon-
sistent and harsk results.
INCONSISTENT RESULTS
The replevin-tender back case
In Perkins v. Bostic5 plaintiff traded his Chevrolet to the defen-
dant for a new Dodge, the remainder of the purchase price being a
note secured by a chattel mortgage on the Dodge. No certificate of
title to the Chevrolet was given by the plaintiff to the defendant.
Subsequently, plaintiff sought to replevy his Chevrolet. The court
held that return of the consideration received, i.e., a tender back by
plaintiff, was a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action
for replevin. Before the plaintiff could recover his Chevrolet he
would have to return the Dodge.' 6
Because sales in contravention of the statute are declared void, it
is theoretically difficult to justify the requirement of prior tender.
It is well established that no prior tender is required to maintain a
replevin action after a void sale, since title has never left the owner,
who has a right to immediate possession without first restoring the
other party to status quoY.7
Apparently the court's chief concern in the Perkins case was that,
14. Robinson v. Poole, 232 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. App. 1950).
15. 227 Mo. App. 352, 56 S.W.2d 155 (1933).
16. Id. at 354, 56 S.W.2d at 156.
17. "A void contract is no contract at all .... It requires no disaflirmance to
avoid it . . . ." 12 Am. Jur., Contracts § 10 (1938). "A void contract need not be
rescinded." Id. at § 437. And see id. at § 451, which states "the very idea of
rescinding a contract implies that what has been parted with shall be restored on
both sides.... Hence, the general rule is that a party who wishes to rescind an
agreement must place the opposite party in statu quo."
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without a requirement of prior tender, defendant might be deprived
of both an automobile and his money, the plaintiff being unjustly
enriched. Therefore, it is submitted that this decision was fair even
though the tender requirement as set forth by the court is inconsistent
with the common law concerning void contracts.
Secured note cases
The cases of CIT Corp. v. Byrnes'8 and Robertson v. Snideri9 pre-
sent a major inconsistency in results reached under the statute.
In the CIT case, defendant purchased an automobile without ob-
taining a certificate of title from the vendor and gave his note secured
by a chattel mortgage on the automobile in payment. Subsequently
the vendor, without delivering the certificate of title, sold the note
and the mortgage to plaintiff-finance company, who brought an action
for replevin to get the car when defendant defaulted on the note.
The court stated that, although the sale of the automobile was void
for non-compliance with the statute, "the statute does not declare
void a note, or other indebtedness, given in the sale of an automobile
where no certificate of title changes hands.' 20 The court further
stated that plaintiff, being a holder in due course, "is entitled to
recover possession of the car."21 In the Robertson case, a similar
situation, the court held that under the statute the sale and the chattel
mortgage were void, and thus plaintiff-finance company could not
bring replevin. 22
In both of these cases plaintiff held a note and a chattel mortgage.
In the CIT case, the court said that the note was not void but failed
to mention the effect of the statute on the chattel mortgage, whereas
in the Robertson case, the court said that the mortgage was void but
omitted any pronouncement on the note.
The court in the CIT case in effect held that the chattel mortgage
was valid, since it is well established that the holder of a note has
only the possessory rights that are given to him by the chattel mort-
gage securing the note.23 The note itself gives the holder no right to
possession.24 In the Robertson case, even if the court had held the
note valid, the result of the case in denying plaintiff recovery of the
18. 38 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. App. 1931); cf. National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Miller,
76 S.W.2d 703 ( Mo. App. 1934).
19. 63 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. App. 1933). In this case the certificate transferred
by the dealer contained an incorrect motor number. The court, as a result,
treated the case as if no certificate of title had been transferred.
20. 38 S.W.2d at 752.
21. Ibid.
22. 63 S.W.2d at 508.
23. Brown, Personal Property § 107 (2d ed. 1955).
24. Ibid.
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automobile would probably have been the same, since the note alone
gives the holder no possessory rights. Thus, in two cases having
similar factual situations the courts have reached inconsistent deci-
sions and contradictory results. For reasons to be considered in the
section on Remedies, it is submitted that the decision in the CIT case
is more equitable.
UNNECESSARY INJUSTICES
Insurance contracts
The statute has had a pr6nounced impact where insurance con-
tracts have been involved and its application in these instances
appears to be extremely harsh.2 5 In one case in which the purchaser
received an unacknowledged certificate of title and subsequently ac-
quired an insurance policy the court held that the purchaser had no
insurable interest in the automobile which would enable him to pre-
vail in an action on the policy.26 The same result was reached where
a purchaser acquired a proper certificate of title after obtaining an
insurance policy but prior to suffering the damage to his automobile.27
Also where a seller delivered several automobiles to a purchaser,
without the certificates of title, the seller's insurance company was
held liable when the purchaser damaged the automobiles in transit.28
Thus, it is clear in Missouri that for one to have an insurable inter-
est in an automobile he must have a proper certificate of title in his
possession at the time the insurance policy is purchased. This result
-appears needlessly harsh because it overlooks the basic purpose of
the statute-to prevent traffic in stolen automobiles. The extent to
which the denial of an insurable interest to a non-holder of a certifi-
cate of title prevents auto thefts seems negligible. In fact, the better
view would be to allow a thief to insure the automobile which he
steals.29 This would protect the true owner who may not have insur-
ance or whose insurance may not cover damage done to the automo-
bile while in possession of a thief. Recently, in Hadley v. Smith, 10 the
court held that although the purchaser had not received a properly
25. See Mackie & Williams Food Stores, Inc. v. Anchor Cas. Co., 216 F.2d 317
(8th Cir. 1954); Evens v. Home Ins. Co., 231 Mo. App. 932, 82 S.W.2d 111
(1935); Mathes v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 6 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App. 1928);
State ex. rel. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Cox, 306 Mo. 537, 268 S.W. 87, 37 A.L.R.
1456 (1924).
26. In re Cox, supra note 25.
27. Evens v. Home Ins. Co., 231 Mo. App. 932, 82 S.W.2d 111 (1935); Mathes
v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 6 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App. 1928).
28. Robertson v. Central Manufacturers' Mut. Ins. Co., 239 Mo. App. 1169,
207, S.W.2d 59 (1947).
29. See Comment, 4 Mo. L. Rev. 212, 215 (1939).
30. 268 S.W.2d 444 (Mo. App. 1954).
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acknowledged certificate of title to his automobile, he had a special
property interest in it which would enable him to maintain an action
against the defendant who had damaged his car.31 This special
property interest was the right to recover the purchase price paid
by tendering back the automobile if the seller refused or was unable
to deliver the certificate of title.32
It is submitted that the courts of Missouri should extend this last
holding to give the injured party under any of the insurance situa-
tions above a "special property interest," which would be insurable.
Remedies
The statute, as construed by the courts, leaves a party injured by
a void contract few remedies. Those remedies that are available are
often inadequate. It has been held, however, that under proper cir-
cumstances an action of fraud may be maintained.3 3 In Schroeder v.
Zykan3 4 defendant sold his automobile to plaintiff, fraudulently mis-
representing an intention to deliver the certificate of title in the near
future. The certificate was never delivered and plaintiff brought an
action for fraud. Plaintiff prevailed, the court reasoning that al-
though the contract was illegal and void, the elements of fraud were
present, and as long as plaintiff repudiated the contract and tendered
back the automobile, he could recover damages for the fraud.35 With-
out passing on the unusual language of "repudiating," and "tender
back," in the case of a void contract3 6 it is submitted that this remedy,
though available, is limited. Many times the failure to comply with
the statutory requirements is occasioned by inadvertance or innocent
mistake and the injured party cannot maintain an action for fraud.
Money had and received is the remedy most often relied upon by
parties injured by contracts void under the statute.3 7 This remedy
is available if the complainant tenders back the automobile within a
reasonable time and in substantially the same condition as it was
when he received it38 Many times, however, when plaintiff discovers
the void transaction and desires to recover his purchase price this
31. Id. at 450-51; cf. Restatement, Torts § 248 (1934).
32. 268 S.W.2d at 450-51.
33. Schroeder v. Zykan, 255 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. App. 1953).
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 109-12.
36. See text at notes 15-17 supra.
37. See Kesinger v. Burtrum, 295 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. App. 1956); Cantrell v.
Sheppard, 247 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App. 1952); Fowler v. Golden, 240 Mo. App.
627, 212 S.W.2d 93 (1948); Riss & Co. v. Wallace, 239 Mo. App. 979, 195
S.W.2d 881 (1946); Boyer v. Garner, 15 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. App. 1929).
38. Ibid.
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requirement cannot be satisfied. Although one court implied that
where there is good excuse for failure to tender back what has been
received in substantially the same condition, the action may lie,"" the
law is still unclear in this area. A further limitation is that this
remedy only returns the parties to status quo, and does not, like the
action for fraud, compensate the injured party for damages.
The courts have consistently held that an action for breach of
contract will not lie, since a contract made in contravention of the
statute is unlawful and void.4 0 In Winscott v. Frazier,41 an excellent
example of the injustices that result from this position, plaintiff
traded his Packard to the defendant for a new car without receiving
the certificate of title; plaintiff giving defendant a chattel mortgage,
signed in blank, to secure the remaining purchase price. Defendant
subsequently filled in the chattel mortgage at more than the agreed
price and sold the paper to a loan company. Plaintiff, upon receiving
notice from the loan company of the amount due, brought an action
against defendant for breach of contract, claiming that defendant
failed to deliver a certificate of title to him at the time of the trans-
action, and that when delivery was made, the certificate was not
properly acknowledged. The court stated that one cannot bring suit
for breach of an illegal and void contract. 2 The court further rea-
soned that plaintiff could not maintain an action for money had and
received, since he had not made a tender back within a reasonable
time, and when tender was made the car was not in the same condi-
tion as when first received. 43 It does not appear whether the plaintiff
raised the contention of fraud because there is no mention of it in
the opinion. Fraud was probably not considered because the evidence
was too tenuous to support that means of relief. Plaintiff was left
without a proper certificate of title to his car, with a car the purchase
price of which greatly exceeded its value, and without a remedy to
correct this situation.
Considering that the purpose of the statute is to prevent traffic in
stolen automobiles, is there any reason that as between two parties
to a transaction recovery could not be allowed? Is it conceivable that
the legislature was attempting to give the same effect to otherwise
perfectly good contracts between innocent parties as is given to gain-
39. Cantrell v. Sheppard, 247 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Mo. App. 1952). What a
good excuse would be was left unanswered by this court.
40. See Lebcowitz v. Simnims, 300 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. App. 1957); Winscott
v. Frazier, 236 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1951); Craig v. Rueseler Motor Co., 159
S.W.2d 374 (Mo. App. 1942).
41. 236 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App. 1951).
42. Id. at 383.
43. Ibid.
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bling contracts, where moral turpitude is involved?44 Indirectly,
when discussing the availability of an action for money had and
received one court has answered this question in the negative by
stating that the attempted contract, which was void under the statute,
involved no moral turpitude and was simply ualum prohibitum
rather than malum in se.45
It is submitted that the courts should allow actions on the contract
to avoid the result reached in the Winscott case, especially since term-
ing a contract "void" as between two parties, when the rights of third
parties have not intervened, in no way helps to carry out the legis-
lative purpose.
CONCLUSION
No one would doubt the effectiveness of the certificate of title
statute in curbing illegal traffic in automobiles. There have been,
however, injustices which could be corrected without making the
statute less effective. The more harsh results appear in those deci-
sions involving insurance contracts, where failure to have the certifi-
cate of title at the time of obtaining insurance will preclude one from
having an insurable interest, and in the area of remedies, where the
courts have read the statute as preventing actions for breach of con-
tract. It is difficult to see how these results help further the legisla-
tive purpose.
The courts have declared that full effect must be given to the void
provision of the statute, yet they have been inconsistent. For ex-
ample, they require prior tender before certain actions may be main-
tained, even though by established law there need be no tender where
a void contract is involved. However, by requiring the tender back,
the courts have prevented certain injustices. It is submitted that
more equitable results would be reached, if the courts in other in-
stances would make a more flexible application of the statute and
apply it only in situations where the results would be consonant with
the statutory purpose.
44. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 434.010 (1949).
45. Boyer v. Garner, 15 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. App. 1929).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1958/iss3/6
